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Abstract 
We propose a collective induction treatment as an aggregator of information and preferences, 
which enables testing whether consumer preferences for food quality elicited through 
experimental auctions are robust to aggregation. We develop a two-stage estimation method 
based on social judgment scheme theory to identify the determinants of social influence in 
collective induction. Our method is tested in a market experiment aiming to assess 
consumers’ willingness-to-pay for rice quality in Senegal. No significant choice shift was 
observed after collective induction which suggests that consumer preferences for rice quality 
are robust to aggregation. Almost three quarters of social influence captured by the model 
and the variables was explained by social status, market expertise and information. 
Keywords: Vickrey auctions; social decision schemes; group decision-making; word-of 
mouth communication; Sharpe style weights 
JEL classification: C24; C91; C92; D12; D71 
1. Introduction 
Economists have typically focused on markets and auctions as disseminators and aggregators 
of information and preferences. Despite their competitive nature, auctions have been found to 
induce similar learning effects to those in cooperative group interactions (Maciejovsky and 
Budescu, 2007). Repeated auctions with price posting are often used in experimental 
economics to endogenise information and preferences: ‘The repeated signal sent by the prices 
creates a common information pool on the upper end of the value distribution, thereby 
supplying information on the implicit set of preferences and beliefs behind these bids’ 
(Shogren et al., 1994a: 1091). However, some authors have questioned whether the role of 
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such experimental treatments as information and preference aggregators is not undermined by 
bid affiliation bias (Corrigan and Rousu, 2006). 
Whereas economists have focused on auctions, environmental economists have chosen 
interactive cooperative group treatments as aggregators. Inspired by democratic theory 
(Dryzek, 2000), they argued that preferences are socially constructed (or uncovered) through 
the process of deliberation (Howarth and Wilson, 2006: 7): ‘In contrast with valuation 
methods that embrace rigid methodological individualism, group deliberation can potentially 
tap into the diverse store of knowledge and experience held by different group members’. In 
designing their group treatment, they are in fact implicitly following in the footsteps of social 
psychologists’ old tradition of small group research (SGR) on collective induction. Collective 
induction is defined as ‘the cooperative search for descriptive, predictive, and explanatory 
generalizations, rules, and principles’ (Laughlin and Hollingshead, 1995: 94). In the social 
combination theory of collective induction, a group is viewed as a combinatorial mechanism, 
and interaction between participants as a social combinatorial process during which 
individuals with different initial preferences collectively reach consensus.  
Marketing researchers have similarly recognised that ‘cognitions not only are the product 
of the individual’s cognitive activities occurring in a social vacuum but also are strongly 
affected by social interaction,’ and hence have questioned whether ‘[consumer] decisions 
should be studied from a group as well as from an individual perspective’ (Ward and 
Reingen, 1990: 246-260). Marketing research on the influence of social cognition on 
preferences dates back to Arndt’s (1967) field experiment on the impact of word-of-mouth 
(WOM) communication on product acceptance. Since then, there has been a broad agreement 
among managers, marketing researchers, and sociologists that WOM can have a major impact 
on consumer awareness, expectations, perceptions, attitudes, trust, behavioural intentions and 
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behaviour (Arndt, 1967; Herr, Kardes, and Kim, 1991; Buttle, 1998; Allsop, Bassett, and 
Hoskins, 2007; Sweeney, Soutar, and Mazzarol, 2008). At its core, WOM is a process of 
interpersonal influence, in which communications between a sender and a receiver can 
change the receiver’s behaviour or attitudes (Sweeney, Soutar, and Mazzarol, 2008). WOM is 
more credible than marketer-initiated communications because receivers perceive it as having 
passed through the unbiased filter of their peers (Allsop, Bassett, and Hoskins, 2007). 
Negative WOM is more informative than positive WOM, in the sense that it helps consumers 
discriminate between low- and high-quality products (Herr, Kardes, and Kim, 1991).  
The flow of information about new ideas or products often occurs through informal social 
networks, in which early adopters act as an opinion leader, spreading information via WOM 
to others (Czepiel, 1974). Cosmas and Sheth (1980) show that there is a set of common 
dimensions by which opinion leaders are evaluated, but that different cultures assign varying 
weights to these dimensions. The effectiveness of WOM within a consumer network is 
influenced by the strength of social ties. Despite their relative weakness, ‘weak ties’ seem to 
play a key role in the transmission of information throughout social networks, bridging the 
gaps between more socially cohesive primary groups (Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995; 
Sweeney, Soutar, and Mazzarol, 2008). However, despite its long recognised role as an 
information and preference aggregator, and its interpersonal and group-risk-reduction aspects 
(Arndt, 1967), to the best of our knowledge the interface between WOM communication and 
collective induction—although similar processes of social learning—has never been 
explored. 
The fundamental question for researchers—and the main motivation for this paper—is 
how can we elicit those social processes in an experimental setting? Imagine we want to test a 
new product for its marketability. In the lab, the auction mechanism elicits preferences 
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through a process of individual cognition, yet in the real world, those preferences would be 
further shaped through social cognition (Ward and Reingen, 1990). Once we have elicited 
individual preferences in the lab, analysing how they are aggregated beyond the individual 
level would provide a useful preview of those social processes and may reveal the existence 
of negative WOM. It is critical to examine WOM in relation to the product early on, in order 
to encourage the spread of positive WOM and minimise the damage of negative WOM 
(Allsop, Bassett, and Hoskins, 2007). Hence, the question boils down to how we can tap into 
consumers’ pool of shared knowledge and test whether preferences are robust to aggregation. 
A logical strategy would be to open social psychologists’ SGR toolbox and elicit WOM 
exchange directly through collective induction. Since we are interested in the effect of 
collective induction on valuation, we need to design our experimental treatment in a way that 
it provides incentives for exchanging WOM on willingness-to-pay (WTP). The most 
straightforward way to accomplish this is by giving the group an unambiguous task, namely 
to reach consensus on valuation, i.e. to elicit collective WTP (CWTP), for the products under 
research (Demont et al., 2012). Based on the premise that influence is motivated by our 
human social need to be helpful by giving advice, and that people share a common enjoyment 
in seeking out valuable information (Smith et al., 2007), the collective induction treatment as 
described above provides incentives for participants to reveal knowledge, information and 
opinion leadership about the value of the products under research. In other words, it 
aggregates both information and preferences. 
The additional benefit of the collective induction treatment is that it generates data which 
can be used to analyse the determinants of social influence on valuation. However, whether 
social influence affects group decisions is a function of the nature of the task. According to 
Laughlin and Hollingshead’s (1995) third postulate, cooperative group tasks may be arranged 
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on a continuum with highly intellective tasks on one side and highly judgmental tasks on the 
other. Intellective tasks possess objectively correct answers that can be shown to be correct 
(demonstrability) to others. Judgmental tasks do not possess objectively correct answers or 
for which it is not possible to demonstrate that the alternative is correct to others. In a 
judgmental task, such as our collective induction treatment, reaching consensus is the goal of 
the group. Bonner (2000) further distinguishes between highly and moderately judgmental 
tasks. Highly judgmental tasks are at the extreme end of the continuum, for which meaningful 
consensus cannot be reached. These tasks possess no objective correct answer and there are 
no meaningful or rational criteria for judging the relative worth of potential answers or 
opinions. The psychology literature predicts that in the case of highly judgmental tasks, social 
influence is unlikely to affect the group decision-making process. From previous research, 
however, we learned that the collective induction treatment is a typical moderately 
judgmental task (Demont et al., 2012), i.e. a task that may or may not have objectively 
correct answers, but for which meaningful consensus can be reached. In these tasks it is likely 
that social influence will play a role in collective induction (Bonner, 2000). 
Analysing whether consumer preferences are robust to aggregation is similar to assessing 
the impact of WOM on preferences in marketing research or analysing choice shift and group 
polarisation in social psychology. Figure 1 provides a non-exhaustive epistemological 
representation of cross-cutting research themes and key papers in which the concept of 
collective induction treatment is embedded. The informational and interpersonal properties of 
the collective induction treatment naturally connect WOM and stated and revealed preference 
research to SGR. One of the most controversial findings from SGR is that group decisions 
tend to be riskier than individual decisions. This phenomenon rapidly gained notoriety under 
the umbrella ‘risky shift’ (Cartwright, 1971). Risky and cautious shifts are both a part of a 
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more generalised idea known as group-induced attitude polarisation. Though group 
polarisation deals mainly with risk-involving decisions and/or opinions, discussion-induced 
shifts have occurred on several non-risk-involving levels. Choice shift has come to mean the 
difference between individual and collective decisions, whereas group polarisation is 
essentially group-to-individual transfer (Zuber, Crott, and Werner, 1992). 
< INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE > 
Attempts to explain choice shift and group polarisation fall mostly into one of three 
approaches: (i) the normative approach of the social comparison theory (SCT), (ii) the 
informational approach of the persuasive arguments theory (PAT) and the information 
integration theory (IIT), and (iii) the social decision scheme (SDS) theory (Myers and Lamm, 
1976). SCT explains choice shift through normative processes. It states that people are 
motivated both to perceive and present themselves in a socially desirable way and may move 
closer to the social norm when acting in a group than when acting in isolation. Accumulating 
scientific evidence, however, suggests that informational influence produces more frequent 
and stronger shifts than does normative influence (Isenberg, 1986; Kaplan and Miller, 1987). 
Informational influence explanations such as PAT and IIT argue that groups process, weigh 
and integrate information (Anderson and Graesser, 1976) and that shifts are attributed to 
persuasive arguments that are generated during group discussion that were only partially 
available to the average subject prior to discussion. Finally, SDS theory suggests that shifts 
are explained by social decision schemes for combining individual choices. While a variety 
of possible SDSs have been outlined by Davis (1973), most prominent has been the 
suggestion of majority voting. Due to skewness in the distribution of initial individual 
choices, some group members find themselves in the minority. If individuals have single-
peaked preferences and employ majority voting in their decisions then the group decision is 
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equal to the median of the group members’ decisions (Moulin, 1980). SDS theory includes a 
rule of aggregation and an explicit formal model that allows the degree of choice shift for a 
given decision rule to be calculated (Davis, 1973). However, the comparable literature for 
consensus models addressing continuous decisions, such as CWTP, is quite small. Davis 
(1996) later adapted the SDS model to the continuous case resulting in the social judgment 
scheme (SJS) model. In this paper we will extend this line of research. 
Other cross-cutting research fields have also attempted to tackle choice shifts. Marketing 
researchers have attempted to explain the phenomenon by linking the information-processing 
approach to the study of cognition and social networks (Ward and Reingen, 1990). Similarly, 
sociologists advanced social influence network theory to explain that choice shifts are a 
ubiquitous product of the inequalities of interpersonal influence that emerge during 
discussions (e.g. Friedkin, 1999). Social influence network theory integrates important 
features of SCT, PAT and SDS to the extent that the effects of an argument, social 
comparison, and prototypical position can be represented directly as interpersonal influences, 
or as mediated by such influences. Linking the theory to WOM processes has interesting 
implications for viral marketing (Smith et al., 2007). Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) provide a 
formal model to study the way that WOM communication aggregates the information of 
individual agents and conclude that WOM may allow efficient social learning. Some 
economists have attempted to explain choice shift by developing utility-based theories for 
group decision-making, focusing on aggregation of either preferences (e.g. Eliaz, Ray, and 
Razin, 2006) or information (e.g. Sobel, 2006). Others have applied similar theories on 
households, relating choice shift to the property of income pooling (e.g. Munro, 2005; 
Bateman and Munro, 2009). Finally, environmental economists have similarly invoked a 
concept of choice shift to question whether individual preferences are robust to aggregation: 
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‘[…] group willingness to pay for a project that enhances environmental quality will 
systematically differ from the sum of individual net benefits’ (Howarth and Wilson, 2006: 
3).
1
  
The contribution of the present paper is that it extends the research question of choice shift 
to private goods by proposing to use collective induction as a treatment (Demont et al., 2012) 
to test whether consumer preferences for food quality elicited through experimental auctions 
are robust to aggregation. The second contribution of this paper is that we develop a 
multivariate SJS model inspired by classic investment style analysis (Sharpe, 1988; 1992) for 
identifying the determinants of social influence on collective preferences. The results have 
interesting implications for viral marketing which uses WOM delivery to exploit pre-existing 
social networks in order to produce exponential increases in brand awareness, through viral 
processes similar to the spread of an epidemic (Smith et al., 2007; Even-Dar and Shapira, 
2011). Our method is tested in a market experiment of rice quality and branding in Senegal.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 proceeds with a description 
of the market experiment, including experimental design, sampling, procedures and 
econometric models. Section 3 analyses the data and discusses the results. Section 4 draws 
implications and conclusions from the prior sections. 
                                                 
 
1
 However, unlike our collective induction treatment where identifying and measuring the determinants of social 
influence is a central research question, social influence is considered a challenge to the democratic principles 
that justify their group treatment: ‘A key procedural challenge facing deliberative valuation though is thus to 
overcome social status inequalities, so that group members can effectively pool their unique, unshared 
information’ (Howarth and Wilson, 2006: 7). 
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2. Market experiment 
In Senegal, urban consumers have developed a marked preference for imported 100 per cent 
broken rice as a result of the historical influence of the French colonial administration which 
encouraged the import of cheap broken rice from Asia (Brüntrup, Nguyen, and Kaps, 2006). 
Because of its market dominance, we focus on broken rice, termed simply ‘rice’ hereafter for 
brevity. In particular, there is a widespread belief that urban consumers continue to prefer 
imported rice due to the inferior post-harvest grain quality of local rice which is notorious for 
its heterogeneous grain size composition and impurity (Seck et al., 2010; Demont and 
Rizzotto, in press). However, in 2007 a quality rice brand ‘Rival®’ (Riz de la Vallée) was 
introduced in the Senegal River Valley (SRV). Governance of quality (processing, cleaning 
and packaging) and provision of micro-financing is being conducted by the Oxfam-funded 
platform of farmer organisations PINORD (Platforme d’appui aux Initiatives du Nord). 
Branded quality rice is an emerging product in the SRV. In 2008, a total volume of 1,800 tons 
of milled rice (less than 1 per cent of total SRV rice production) was marketed as Rival®. 
However, the product was only available at the level of the milling factories in the Senegal 
River Delta (at 50 km from Saint-Louis) and did not reach the urban market of Saint-Louis, 
the closest large city to the SRV. Hence, it remains to be seen whether and how much urban 
consumers are willing to pay for quality and branding of local rice and whether these 
preferences are robust to aggregation. Therefore, in this study we use an experimental auction 
market (Shogren et al., 1994b; Lusk and Shogren, 2007) with a collective induction treatment 
(Demont et al., 2012) designed to elicit WTP and CWTP for alternative rice qualities. 
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2.1 Experimental design 
We purposely selected four different rice types available in the SRV such that they differed 
only in a bundle of quality attributes which are relevant to rice value chain upgrading 
(Demont and Rizzotto, in press): (i) conventional SRV rice (benchmark), (ii) imported Thai 
rice, (iii) unlabelled quality SRV rice and (iv) labelled quality SRV rice (Rival®). 
Analogously to Roosen et al. (1998), we used a fixed benchmark; we chose the standard 
mediocre quality (conventional) SRV rice type which is commonly available on the market. It 
is easily recognisable as it consists of a mix of varieties (Sahel 108 and 201) and grain sizes 
(broken, medium and long grain) and contains a fair amount of impurities (foreign matter 
such as stones, dirt and husks). In terms of quality and price, this rice type is inferior to the 
three alternatives in the auctions. The unlabelled and labelled quality SRV rice types are the 
same product. Both are the rice variety Sahel 108 and have been purified and carefully sifted 
to obtain a homogenous grain size of 100 per cent broken rice, with the latter being branded 
and marketed as Rival®. Hence, the difference between (i) and (iii) is grain quality (purity 
and homogeneity) and the difference between (iii) and (iv) is the mere presence of a label. 
The imported Thai rice has a grain quality somewhere between the benchmark and quality 
SRV rice and contains some impurities. 
We chose the Vickrey (1961) second-price auction because of its weakly dominant 
strategy for participants to bid their true value for the goods. We ran three auctions 
simultaneously following Melton et al. (1996) and Roosen et al. (1998) and used the endow-
and-upgrade method, i.e. each participant was endowed with one kilogram of the benchmark 
rice and was asked three times to submit a bid for upgrading this kilogram to a kilogram of an 
alternative rice type. We explained to participants that one product and one bidding round 
would be binding. This decision was made to avoid the substitution effect that might arise if 
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participants could win more than one product, which would in turn compromise bidding their 
true value for the products. 
After purchases are made, consumers will often make comparisons between their 
expectations and the product performance they experience. If performance is below 
expectation, the customer might end up dissatisfied and might sense an imbalance in his/her 
cognitive system, a phenomenon called ‘cognitive dissonance’ (Festinger, 1957). One 
available strategy for customers who experience discomfort from cognitive dissonance is to 
share their discomfort via WOM and to seek information via WOM from sources which can 
reduce the discomfort (Buttle, 1998). In order to capture this phenomenon, we insert a tasting 
session designed as a within-subjects information treatment and followed by a second auction 
round between the first individual auction round and the collective induction treatment. 
Finally, by making the collective induction treatment non-binding and positioning it after the 
binding individual rounds, participants are assumed to have reduced incentives to 
strategically withhold information (Maciejovsky and Budescu, 2007) and misrepresent their 
preferences ('strategy-proofness', e.g. Moulin, 1980; Steinel and De Dreu, 2004) during 
collective induction. 
2.2 Sampling 
In November 2008, we conducted 10 experimental sessions over the course of five days in 
Saint-Louis’ youth centre, which is located 500 m from the central market. To minimise 
costs, we conducted two sessions per day, i.e. one in the morning and one in the afternoon. 
This enabled us to check whether bids change during the day in the Senegalese context. We 
focused on women as they are the major decision makers in rice purchasing in Senegal as 
well as in other rice consuming West-African countries (see review by Demont et al., 2012). 
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Although mixed-gender and naturalistic studies are more likely to capture the processes of 
real, functioning groups, their use would sacrifice experimental control (e.g. over group 
membership, status structures) (Rao and Steckel, 1991) and would introduce complicating 
factors related to the property of income pooling (Munro, 2005). Therefore, in order to 
balance out extraneous status variables or other individual difference influences during 
collective induction (Kirchler and Davis, 1986), for each session, we recruited an ad hoc 
group of 10 female participants using a purposive non-probability sampling method; women 
were selected and recruited on the spot, most of whom were going to or returning from the 
market. In order to include a random factor during sampling, every third female passer-by 
with an estimated age between 18 and 65 was approached. Whenever we approached a group, 
we selected maximally one participant to ensure that the participants would not know each 
other. 
2.3 Procedures 
Each experimental session involved eight steps: 
Step 1. During recruitment, we told participants they were going to participate in a two-
hour market test and receive a participation fee of 3,000 FCFA (EUR 5) ‘for their taxi back 
home.’ The latter pretext is commonly used in Africa to detach pecuniary endowments from 
their ‘gift’ or ‘payment-for-service’ context. It elegantly avoids the fee being seen as a quid 
pro quo for which participants should reciprocate (Lusk and Shogren, 2007), and which may 
bias the bids (Loureiro, Umberger, and Hine, 2003). 
Step 2. We conducted the experimental session in the national language of Wolof with 
translations to Pulaar and French when necessary. The four rice types were presented in 50 
kg bags on a table in front of a meeting room and in four plates on each participant’s table. 
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Each plate contained one kilogram of the rice type and corresponded to a bag on the front 
table. Only the Thai and Rival® bags on the front table were labelled; the other rice types 
were presented in plain white bags. We explained to participants that we endowed them with 
one kilogram of the benchmark rice. During the experiment, participants could examine the 
visual (purity and homogeneity) and sensory (taste and aroma) quality attributes of the 
uncooked rice types.  
Step 3. We explained the auction procedures to the participants. First, we explained the 
endow-and-upgrade method. We used the analogy of buying new jewellery in exchange for 
old jewellery, where only the price for ‘upgrading’ is paid, a buying method commonly 
applied by Senegalese women in the jewellery market. We learned from the trial session that 
price premiums elicited through the endow-and-upgrade method were more reliable after 
‘calibration,’ i.e. providing the absolute market price of the benchmark rice (300 FCFA/kg or 
EUR 0.46/kg in November 2008). However, we did not reveal and asked the participants not 
to reveal any price information on the alternative rice types. Both calibration and the use of 
an analogy considerably accelerated the learning process of the endow-and-upgrade method. 
Secondly, we explained the second-price auction mechanism. 
Step 4. Following Shogren et al. (1994b), we used commonly known brands of biscuits to 
familiarise the participants with the auction procedure. Each participant received a small 
package of biscuits and was then asked to bid on two alternative, superior types of biscuits. 
We conducted two rounds with an evaluation after each round in order to ensure that all 
participants fully comprehended the system. 
Step 5. We explained to participants that we would use a similar procedure for the four 
rice types, i.e. two auction trials without price posting, and that we would randomly select 
one rice type and one individual bidding round as binding. We used a two-stage approach to 
15 
 
elicit WTP (Haines, Guilkey, and Popkin, 1988). For each alternative rice type we first asked 
which product the participant preferred between the benchmark and the upgrade. If she chose 
the benchmark, the value was automatically set to zero (Lusk et al., 2001). If the alternative 
was chosen, we asked her WTP to upgrade to one kilogram of the alternative rice type. 
Responses were recorded privately for each participant. Between the two rounds, we included 
a tasting session during which the participants could experience the sensory quality attributes 
(aroma, taste, texture and stickiness) and observe the swelling capacity of the cooked rice 
types. To ensure equal sensory experience, the rice representing unlabelled and Rival® rice 
came from the same cooking pot. 
Step 6. We asked the participants to gather around a table and attempt to achieve a 
consensus on their CWTP to upgrade the benchmark rice to each alternative rice type. 
Following common practice in SGR, no specific method of doing so was imposed or implied. 
Groups were left alone during the discussion that followed to avoid bias from the researchers. 
After consensus, the group reported the CWTP values. 
Step 7. We conducted a short survey through a one-page questionnaire to collect socio-
demographic data. We conducted the survey after the rice auctions to avoid revealing the 
study’s objectives (Corrigan and Rousu, 2008). To test group success, the survey included a 
question on whether or not the participants agreed with the CWTP values reached through 
group consensus (Cartwright, 1971; Sniezek and Henry, 1989; Ito et al., 2009). 
Step 8. We randomly selected one rice type, one biscuit type and one bidding round as 
binding, deducted the second price from the participation fees of the winning bidders and 
distributed the rice and the adjusted participation fees to the participants. 
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2.4 Determinants of WTP 
To identify the factors that influence the individual bids, the Tobit model can be used because 
of the mass of non-positive bids. However, since we followed a two-stage approach for 
eliciting WTP (Step 5 in Section 2.3), we adopted the double hurdle model by Cragg (1971). 
Let mijpr be the variable representing the desirability of upgrading an endowed kilogram of 
rice and let WTPijpr be the amount spent on the purchase by the ith consumer (i = 1, …, 10) in 
the jth session (j = 1, …, 10) for the pth rice type (p = imported, unlabelled, labelled) in the 
rth bidding round (r = 0 before tasting, r = 1 after tasting): 
        
                 (1) 
          
                 (2) 
where xijpr is a vector of independent variables including two dummy variables (imported and 
labelled) identifying the three alternative rice types (unlabelled is set as the numeraire), a 
dummy variable for the bidding round, and a vector of socio-demographic variables xv (v = 1, 
…, s = 13), α is a conformable vector of coefficients, uij is an individual specific disturbance 
for participant i in session j, and vijpr is the overall error term. 
 WTPijpr is the consumers’ bid to upgrade the benchmark rice to the three alternatives. The 
first hurdle is the consumer’s decision of whether or not to pay for the three alternatives. The 
probability of the respondent choosing not to bid a positive amount (WTPijpr = 0) is expressed 
by: 
    (         )       
        (3) 
where Φ is the standard normal density function. The second hurdle determines the effect of 
independent variables on WTPijpr, given WTPijpr > 0. The distribution of WTPijpr conditional 
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on being positive is truncated at zero with mean   
       and variance σ
2
. The second hurdle 
is formulated as: 
 (       |         )  
   ⁄   [           
     ⁄ ]
    
    ⁄  
 (4) 
where Φ is the standard normal density function and α2 is a vector of coefficients.  
2.5 Determinants of social influence on CWTP 
In order to assess the determinants of social influence on CWTP, we may reasonably assume 
that the lower the distance between the individual and the group response, the higher the 
intra-group influence of the individual (Davis, 1996; Bonner, Sillito, and Baumann, 2007). 
Factors that increase (decrease) the distance increase (decrease) divergence between group 
and individual bids. Therefore, we regress the absolute differences (distances) between WTP 
and CWTP to the same set of independent variables through ordinary least squares (OLS): 
|              |   
                 (5) 
where        represents the collective WTP for product p in session j. 
However, the ‘naïve model’ of group influence in equation (5) may not capture the 
complex internal mechanism of collective decision making. Therefore, we develop a two-
stage approach inspired from social combination theory of collective induction in which we 
assume that group decisions are weighted sums of individual preferences (Davis, 1973; Kerr 
et al., 1975; Sniezek and Henry, 1989; Laughlin and Hollingshead, 1995; Davis, 1996; 
Bonner, Sillito, and Baumann, 2007). In SJS models, it is sometimes assumed that the 
individual weights in group decisions, i.e. the intra-group influence of individuals, are 
exponential in nature (e.g. Davis, 1996; Bonner, Sillito, and Baumann, 2007). However, since 
the majority of our socio-demographic variables are dummy variables, we opted for linear 
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weights to preserve the dummy character of the variables (zero versus an equally shared 
weight). We also observed that for continuous variables (age, household income, and 
household size) linear weights produced a better response in the analysis proposed below and 
even more so when the continuous variables were transformed to dummy variables relative to 
the group average: 
     
{
 
        
 
 
∑     
 
   
       
 
 
∑     
 
   
 
(6) 
Analogously to Bonner, Sillito and Baumann (2007), in a first stage the CWTP for each 
session j and each product p was predicted by transforming each of the alternative socio-
demographic variables of the vector xv (v = 1, …, s = 12) to individual weights which are 
used to compute the weighed group average of the individual post-tasting (r = 1) WTP 
estimates: 
         ∑            
 
   
  ∑
    
∑     
 
   
 
   
         (7) 
where         represents the CWTP in session j for product p, predicted through a 
univariate SJS model based on the variable xv,      is the weight of participant i in session j 
for product p, and      is the dummy value of the transformed socio-demographic variable xv 
for participant i in session j. It is interesting to note that the univariate SJS model as a 
preference and (implicit) information aggregator in equation (7) is similar to Ellison and 
Fudenberg’s (1995: 98-99) theoretical conceptualisation of WOM communication in social 
learning: ‘When agents do re-evaluate their choice, they ask N other individuals chosen at 
random from the population distribution about their current choice and current payoff. The 
sampling agents then compute the average payoff […].’ 
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The empirical psychology SDS and SJS literature typically analyses group decision-
making by assessing the goodness-of-fit (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) of univariate models 
(e.g. Davis, 1996; Bonner, Sillito, and Baumann, 2007), as in the first stage of our approach 
presented in equation (7). However, the possibility of group decisions being formed through 
the simultaneous weighting and interaction of multiple univariate SJS models has not yet 
been explored to the best of our knowledge. Therefore, as a second stage we propose the 
following multivariate SJS model for identifying the determinants of social influence in 
collective induction: 
        ∑              
 
   
         [   ] ∑  
 
   
   (8) 
where        represents the observed CWTP for product p in session j,    the weight of 
each univariate SJS model based on the socio-demographic variable xv, s the number of 
socio-demographic variables and     the unsystematic residual for product p in session j. 
The model and coefficient restrictions presented in equation (8) are analogous to classic 
investment style analysis, where the relationship is analysed between fund returns and a 
collection of index returns (Sharpe, 1988; 1992). In this literature, equation (8) is typically 
estimated through quadratic programming techniques. The resulting coefficients, called 
‘Sharpe style weights,’ are used to form inferences about a portfolio’s behaviour and 
composition. The objective is to find the ‘best’ set of weights that lie between zero and one 
and add up to one. The best set of weights is the one for which the variance of     in equation 
(8) is lowest. Thus equation (8) is rearranged as follows: 
   
   
(   )
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   (9) 
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In this way, this technique is similar to OLS estimation. However, the constraints on the 
weights make regression analysis unsuitable and require the use of quadratic programming.
2
 
The weights finally represent the share of each socio-demographic variable in explaining 
social influence in collective induction. 
3. Data and results 
3.1 Descriptive analysis 
The recruitment procedure resulted in a participation rate of approximately 50 per cent which 
suggests that urban consumers were on average indifferent between participating and not 
participating. A total of 99 participants participated in the 10 experimental sessions; one of 
the women participated twice, thus we cancelled the results of her second participation. Table 
1 shows the key summary statistics of the participants’ socio-demographic characteristics 
recorded by the questionnaire. We did not find any statistically significant differences 
between the characteristics of the morning and afternoon samples. The average age recorded 
was 37 years; 21 per cent of the women were employed and another 32 per cent were small 
traders. The majority had only completed primary school or had not followed any formal 
education. These figures are consistent with Fall and Diagne (2008) and demographic surveys 
(ANSD, 2008). The average monthly household earnings were around 145,000 FCFA (EUR 
221) and the average household size was 10. Less than one fifth of the women had a cooking 
housemaid and the average time spent on lunch preparation, including going to the market, 
                                                 
 
2
 See Atkinson and Choi (2001) for a practical application of Sharpe’s style analysis using Excel’s Solver 
function. 
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preparation and actual cooking, was more than four hours per day. More than 80 per cent of 
the women were aware of the existence of quality SRV rice. This is in line with the results 
from Fall et al. (2007) who observed that the awareness of local rice is quite high in urban 
areas close to production zones. 
< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE > 
Descriptive statistics of the individual and collective bids are shown in Table 2. Bids 
represent WTP to upgrade conventional rice to quality rice or, in other words, price premiums 
for quality attributes. Due to the mass of non-positive bids and the censored character of our 
WTP estimates, we report the mean of the positive bids in addition to the mean of all bids. 
We rarely encountered the case where the participant preferred the upgrade, but was not 
willing to pay a price premium (WTP = 0). Therefore, similarly to Lusk et al. (2001), we did 
not distinguish between zero bids and the case where the participant preferred the benchmark 
and was not willing to upgrade (non-positive bids). Average positive individual bids ranged 
from 122 to 165 FCFA/kg (EUR 0.19–0.25/kg), depending on the product and the bidding 
round. Bids were lower for imported rice than for quality SRV rice. After tasting, the 
propensity for upgrading declined and bids dropped. We did not find evidence in support of a 
choice shift; collective bids were not significantly different from individual group means or 
group medians based on a pairwise t-test and a significance level of 5 per cent. Table 2 
suggests that, analogously to Demont et al. (2012) and Ito et al. (2009), individual 
preferences were reflected as a collective choice more in a consensus rule than in a majority 
rule, as CWTP only slightly departs from mean WTP towards group medians. Only in the 
case of imported rice, the departure towards group medians is more pronounced. Although 
the effect is not statistically significant, feedback from the groups suggested two potential 
explanations. First, since the experiment was conducted close to a rice production zone, 
22 
 
normative and affective processes may have driven participants closer to the social norm of 
devaluing foreign, imported rice (Obermiller and Spangenberg, 1989). We may find a 
different effect in urban consumption zones closer to the port and remote from production 
zones (e.g. Dakar). Secondly, some groups feared that their responses were consequential and 
would be used by the government as a justification to raise import taxes and therefore 
strategically proposed low collective bids for imported rice, a potential bias which was also 
described by Lusk and Shogren (2007). 
< INSERT TABLE 2 HERE > 
3.2 Determinants of WTP 
The determinants of WTP identified through the double hurdle model are presented in the 
first two columns of results in Table 3. The first column shows the effects of the rice 
characteristics and consumer demographics on the probability that a consumer will upgrade 
the benchmark rice, while the determinants of the WTP are presented in the second column. 
Three observations can be made. First, conducting the experiment during the morning not 
only increased the buying probability but also positively affected the WTP. Our results are 
consistent with similar findings in Benin (Demont et al., 2012), and suggest that time of day 
affects valuation of rice in the Senegalese context. For most participants, the morning 
sessions meant an interruption in their daily routine of going to the market and preparing rice 
dishes for lunch, which is invariably the most important meal of the day in Senegal (Fall et 
al., 2007). Those who still had rice purchasing
3
 in mind may value rice higher than those in 
                                                 
 
3
 More than a quarter of the women purchase rice on a daily basis (Table 1). 
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the afternoon who just had their lunch and completed their daily rice purchases in the 
morning. 
< INSERT TABLE 3 HERE > 
Secondly, the propensity of upgrading dropped by 14 per cent after the tasting session. 
Bids also dropped, but the effect was only weakly significant at 10 per cent. As the 
benchmark rice was purified before cooking, it was less discounted in cooked form than in 
non-cooked form. Several participants particularly appreciated its sensory qualities and some 
even considered its mixed composition as an advantage because it allows them to obtain 
different grain types (broken, medium and long) from a single rice product by separating 
them on their own. 
Thirdly, the participants were 33 per cent less likely to upgrade to imported rice than to 
unlabelled quality SRV rice and discounted imported rice by 43 FCFA/kg (EUR 0.07/kg) 
relative to unlabelled quality SRV rice. They were further willing to pay an average price 
premium of 29 FCFA/kg (EUR 0.04/kg) for Rival® relative to the unlabelled quality SRV 
rice. Prices recorded on the urban Saint-Louis market in November 2008 were 300 FCFA/kg 
(EUR 0.46/kg) for conventional SRV rice (benchmark) and 360 FCFA/kg (EUR 0.55/kg) for 
Thai 100 per cent broken rice. Our findings suggest that roughly three quarters (Table 2) of 
consumers in Saint-Louis are willing to upgrade from conventional to branded, quality SRV 
rice and consumers are willing to pay price premiums (calibrated to market prices) of 34 per 
cent for quality rice and 44 per cent for branded quality rice such as Rival®. At the time of 
the experimental auctions, Rival® was only sold at the level of the milling factories in the 
SRV (at 50 km from Saint-Louis) at 300 FCFA/kg (EUR 0.46/kg), i.e. at no price premium 
relative to conventional SRV rice, and did not reach the urban market of Saint-Louis because 
the limited quantities that were available had been sold-out immediately. Given that manual 
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cleaning, purification and homogenisation of rice was done at the Saint-Louis market at 7–
13% of the price of conventional SRV rice, i.e. still smaller than the average price premium 
of 16% for imported rice (Demont and Rizzotto, in press), our econometric results suggest 
that value chain initiators have some price flexibility for introducing branded quality SRV 
rice on the Saint-Louis market and capturing part of the consumer surplus. 
Traders, who are more familiar with the local rice market and available substitutes, were 
28 per cent more reluctant to upgrade. Moreover, indigenous Wolof and Pulaar participants 
bid less for quality SRV rice than non-indigenous participants, probably because they have 
grown up with the mediocre-quality SRV rice and are comfortable with its visual and sensory 
attributes. Comparatively lower bids were also recorded for highly educated participants. 
Surprisingly and in contrast to rural Beninese consumers (Demont et al., 2012), income did 
not affect either the propensity of upgrading or WTP for rice quality. 
3.3 Determinants of social influence on CWTP 
The collective induction treatment achieved a high rate of consensus as 96 per cent of the 
participants agreed with the group decisions (Table 1), which is the criterion for group 
success in judgmental tasks (Laughlin and Hollingshead, 1995). In order to analyse the 
determinants of the distances between WTP and CWTP, we present the results of the ‘naïve 
model’ (equation 5) in the last column in Table 3. Negative coefficients suggest convergence 
and positive coefficients suggest divergence. We find more divergence in the morning 
sessions and more convergence for post-tasting valuation. Participants tended to converge 
more on the value of imported rice, due to greater familiarity with this rice type, in contrast to 
an emerging, less familiar product, such as quality SRV rice. Branding further caused 
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divergence among women indicating that larger concessions needed to be made to reach 
consensus on the added-value of a rice brand. 
However, as expected the ‘naïve model’ does not allow us to identify any socio-
demographic variables (except higher education) that significantly influence the individual 
within-group distances. Therefore, we present the Sharpe style weights estimated through our 
multivariate SJS model in Table 4, representing the share of each socio-demographic variable 
in explaining participants’ social influence during collective induction. The model identifies 
six non-binding univariate SJS models interacting in group decision-making, explaining 34 
per cent of social influence by social status and general experience (age), 28 per cent by 
trading experience, 20 per cent by household experience (housewife), 11 per cent by 
knowledge (having received prior information about local rice) on the topic, 6 six per cent by 
social networking experience, and 1 per cent by higher education.
4
 Age is a directly 
observable determinant of social status and experience and market expertise is revealed by 
traders during the session. The dominance of social status and expertise in group decision-
making is consistent with typical findings in SGR literature (Kirchler and Davis, 1986; 
Ohtsubo and Masuchi, 2004; Bonner, Sillito, and Baumann, 2007). Other socio-demographic 
variables in our experiment were either unobservable (trader, household size, group 
membership, housewife, employment and daily purchase), unless they were revealed during 
group discussion, or only quasi-observable (household income, cooking housemaid, higher 
                                                 
 
4
 It is important to note that our model is only able to identify determinants that have been captured through our 
limited set of socio-demographic variables and hence ignores other factors of social influence (e.g. extroversion) 
not captured in our survey (Bonner, Sillito, and Baumann, 2007). 
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education and indigenous) to other participants. For example, income is quasi-observable 
through women’s behaviour or dressing style. For some participants, estimating household 
earnings was problematic and probably subject to upwards social desirability bias (Lusk and 
Shogren 2007). To facilitate estimation, we asked participants to identify their total 
household earnings among seven income classes. Nevertheless, neither the continuous, nor 
the dummy, nor the reversed dummy variable (to check the possibility of income being 
inversely related to influence) yielded a satisfactory outcome, neither did the dummy 
‘cooking housemaid’ which was expected to be a convenient alternative proxy for income. 
The social influence of traders is consistent with the finding that product involvement is an 
important antecedent to opinion leadership (Richins and Root-Schaffer, 1988). The results 
may explain earlier findings, e.g. traders may have partly been responsible for driving down 
CWTP of imported rice (Table 2) as they represented 32 per cent of the participants (Table 
1), featured a lower propensity to upgrade (Table 3), and captured 28 per cent of influence in 
explained collective decision-making (Table 4). 
< INSERT TABLE 4 HERE > 
4. Implications and conclusions 
In this paper we test whether consumer preferences for food quality elicited through 
experimental auctions are robust to aggregation through collective induction and develop a 
multivariate social judgment scheme model for identifying the determinants of social 
influence in collective induction. A market experiment of rice quality and branding in 
Senegal is used to test the method. It is believed that the preference of urban Senegalese 
consumers for imported rice is due to the inferior post-harvest grain quality of local rice. 
Quality needs to be governed at different levels, i.e. from on-farm varietal purity to post-
harvest cleaning, sorting, homogenising, and packaging (Demont and Rizzotto, in press). 
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Assessing WTP for rice quality would therefore provide crucial end-market information for 
rice value chain upgrading in Senegal. 
Consumers’ bids elicited through experimental auctions suggest that there are three major 
market segments of rice consumers in Saint-Louis: (i) a segment of consumers who prefer 
conventional SRV rice (roughly one quarter of the bids);
5
 (ii) a segment of consumers who 
are willing to upgrade from conventional to branded, quality SRV rice (roughly three quarters 
of the bids), and (iii) a sub-segment of the second segment of consumers who are also willing 
to upgrade to imported rice (roughly half of the bids). We found that consumers are willing to 
pay an average price premium of 34 per cent for quality SRV rice and 44 per cent for branded 
quality SRV rice such as Rival®. This indicates that investment in quality tailored to end-
market standards, and branding can render local rice competitive with imported rice. 
Moreover, stakeholders who are willing to invest in rice value chain upgrading in Senegal 
have some price flexibility for introducing branded quality SRV rice on the Saint-Louis 
market and capturing part of the consumer surplus. However, after tasting, the propensity of 
upgrading—a proxy for repeat purchase intentions—declined due to the improved sensory 
quality of the cooked benchmark rice, which suggests there may be limits to post-harvest 
grain quality upgrading. Nevertheless, the existence of a substantial market segment of 
conventional SRV rice consumers suggests that any strategy of value chain upgrading to 
increase food security for the poor should serve both market segments (conventional and 
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 In Ghana, Tomlins et al. (2005) identified a similar market segment (14 per cent) for traditional local rice. 
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quality rice) in order to consider the trade-off between adding value and increasing 
affordability (Tomlins et al., 2007). 
Collective induction revealed that while consumers tended to converge on the value of a 
long established product such as imported rice, they tended to diverge on their valuation of 
branding. This may indicate the existence of market segments with different preference 
patterns. Therefore, from a marketing perspective, further profiling of the three market 
segments is recommended, as a targeted product positioning and communication is likely to 
be more effective than a generic strategy (Verbeke, 2005; Pieniak et al., 2010). Nevertheless, 
no significant choice shift was observed for any of the quality attributes, suggesting that the 
consumer preferences for rice quality elicited through our experimental auctions are robust to 
aggregation through collective induction. 
Almost three quarters of captured social influence was explained by social status, market 
expertise and information. Senegalese women are highly involved in trading and social 
networking; 32 per cent of the participants were traders and 46 per cent were active members 
of a formal group. Marketing strategies based on WOM and viral processes need to (i) 
identify influential existing social networks (e.g. female networks, tontines, trader 
associations, religious networks), and (ii) target key influential persons (e.g. opinion leaders) 
in those networks to convince them of the product’s value. More than half of women had 
received prior information on SRV rice. 44 per cent of this information came from WOM 
exchange, versus 56 per cent from traditional media (TV, radio and newspapers), suggesting 
that any successful marketing strategy will need to target both channels simultaneously in 
order to be effective and credible. Further research is needed to determine the rates of return 
to promotion through both channels to determine the optimal mix of advertising expenditures. 
Nevertheless, the findings presented in this paper provide useful information for rice value 
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chain upgrading in Senegal. They can assist rice value chain investors in designing labelling 
and marketing strategies and provide useful information for rice traders, retailers and local 
rice farmers in the SRV and national policy makers who are currently implementing an 
ambitious food self-sufficiency program. 
Our experiment provides useful information for future experimental consumer research. It 
shows that experimental auctions can be complemented by a collective induction treatment at 
almost no incremental cost (achieving consensus took at most ten minutes). The collective 
induction treatment provides an ex ante tool for marketers to test at an early stage whether 
consumer preferences for a new product are robust to aggregation, such that they can guide 
the spread of positive WOM and minimise the damage of possible negative WOM (Allsop, 
Bassett, and Hoskins, 2007). In the same way that experimental auctions do not focus 
primarily on the outcomes of the auction (e.g. first and second bid), but rather on obtaining 
true WTP estimates, the collective induction treatment is not centred on the outcome (CWTP 
value), but on the individual-group difference (choice shift) and the individual-into-group 
process (determinants of social influence). 
Moreover, the mechanism of individual induction elicited by the experimental auction 
procedure encouraged participants to invest more cognitive effort in determining their ‘true’ 
valuation of food quality. This method improves the quality of moderately judgmental 
consensus tasks, such as the collective induction treatment. However, future research is 
required in order to make the collective induction treatment incentive compatible, such that 
participants have greater incentives to exchange WOM and express opinion leadership on 
valuation. A necessary step will also be to add an individual auction round after the collective 
induction treatment in order to capture post-treatment group polarisation effects (impact of 
WOM on individual WTP). This will not only generate information on the WOM source 
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(social influence), such as in this paper, but also on the receiver (susceptibility to WOM and 
influence). It will be important to randomly choose one of the auction rounds as binding, in 
order to make the procedure strategy-proof (Moulin, 1980; Steinel and De Dreu, 2004; 
Maciejovsky and Budescu, 2007). Moreover, the treatment may need to be analysed by 
switching regression models, as WOM may be positive or negative depending on the group. 
Such research may substantially contribute to both the economic literature on revealed 
preference methods and the social psychology literature on choice shift and group 
polarisation. 
Finally, the study faces some limitations inherent to its research approach and data 
collection procedure, e.g. its non-probability sampling methods, which restrict generalisation 
of the findings to a broader population level. Therefore, it is recommended to perform further 
studies with a similar focus, targeted at similar population groups, in different environmental 
settings. The empirical evidence reported in this study should therefore be interpreted within 
its specific context and setting. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of socio-demographic variables in the experimental sample 
Variable Definition Mean (st. dev.) 
Age Age in years 36.6 (12.0) 
Household income Monthly income (1,000 FCFA)
a
 145 (110) 
Household size Number of individuals in household 10.2 (5.45) 
Indigenous 1 = indigenous (Wolof, Pulaar); 0 = otherwise 0.77 (0.42) 
Education 0 = none; 1 = primary; 2 = secondary; 3 = tertiary 1.18 (1.11) 
Higher education 1 = secondary and tertiary; 0 = otherwise 0.27 (0.45) 
Daily 1 = daily rice purchase; 0 = otherwise 0.27 (0.45) 
Employed 1 = employed; 0 = otherwise 0.21 (0.41) 
Trader 1 = trader as profession; 0 = otherwise 0.32 (0.47) 
Housewife 1 = housewife; 0 = otherwise 0.30 (0.46) 
Student 1 = student; 0 = otherwise 0.06 (0.24) 
Cooking housemaid 1 = has a cooking housemaid; 0 = otherwise 0.18 (0.39) 
Cooking time Total time in hours spent on preparing lunch (going to the market, 
preparation and actual cooking) 
4.30 (1.10) 
Group membership 1 = member of a formal group; 0 = otherwise 0.46 (0.50) 
Information 1 = received information on SRV rice; 0 = otherwise 0.58 (0.50) 
Awareness
b
  1 = awareness of quality SRV rice; 0 = otherwise 0.82 (0.38) 
Agreement 1 = agreed with group consensus; 0 = otherwise 0.96 (0.20) 
Sample size  99 
Notes: 
a
 fixed exchange rate: EUR 1 = 655.957 FCFA 
b 
based on a sample size of 79 participants as during the first two sessions this question was not yet included
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of individual and collective willingness-to-pay 
 Rice type Pre-tasting WTP Post-tasting WTP CWTP 
Propensity of upgrading (per cent) Imported 51 43 80 
Unlabelled 81 70 100 
Labelled 80 67 100 
     
Mean of positive bids (FCFA) Imported 134 (98) 122 (80) 51 (28) 
Unlabelled 155 (100) 129 (83) 88 (38) 
Labelled 165 (107) 154 (112) 100 (37) 
     
Mean of all bids
a
 (FCFA) Imported 68 (97) 53 (80) 41 (33) 
Unlabelled 125 (109) 90 (91) 88 (38) 
Labelled 132 (116) 103 (117) 100 (37) 
     
Mean of group medians
a,b
 (FCFA) Imported 39 (34) 33 (41) 41 (33) 
Unlabelled 110 (63) 74 (66) 88 (38) 
Labelled 113 (66) 80 (64) 100 (37) 
Notes: WTP = willingness-to-pay; CWTP = collective willingness-to-pay; fixed exchange rate: EUR 1 = 
655.957 FCFA; price of the benchmark rice = 300 FCFA/kg (EUR 0.46/kg) in November 2008; standard 
deviations are in parentheses 
a
 We set the non-positive bids to zero. CWTP was not significantly different from group means or group 
medians of WTP based on a pairwise t-test and a significance level of 5 per cent. 
b
 In the case of CWTP, we take the mean of all group bids.  
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Table 3. Determinants of consumers’ individual and collective willingness-to-pay 
Independent variables 
First hurdle 
Propensity of upgrading 
Second hurdle 
Amount paid |WTP – CWTP| 
Constant 0.706 (0.034)** 96.877 (17.023)** 93.128 (30.809)** 
Morning 0.279 (0.077)** 81.484 (27.896)** 21.964 (8.242)** 
Imported –0.328 (0.053)** –43.414 (17.314)* –15.885 (5.704)** 
Labelled –0.030 (0.027) 28.795 (12.791)* 21.719 (5.440)** 
Post-tasting –0.135 (0.037)** –29.644 (16.124) –10.434 (5.454)* 
Age –0.002 (0.004) –0.223 (1.058) –0.426 (0.331) 
Household income –0.000 (0.000) 0.032 (0.178) –0.026 (0.028) 
Household size –0.006 (0.007) 0.063 (2.971) 0.719 (1.009) 
Indigenous –0.118 (0.079) –60.114 (30.108)* –14.584 (12.025) 
Higher education 0.030 (0.095) –83.776 (40.709)* –26.715 (10.622)* 
Daily –0.035 (0.084) –9.647 (32.889) –3.742 (9.954) 
Employed –0.140 (0.141) 38.260 (47.624) 2.301 (16.849) 
Trader –0.285 (0.138)* 28.007 (43.968) –9.825 (14.497) 
Housewife –0.214 (0.138) 6.884 (41.548) –12.731 (13.785) 
Student 0.347 (0.232) 186.648 (71.843)** 56.589 (41.669) 
Cooking housemaid –0.075 (0.092) 59.449 (34.348) 13.085 (11.092) 
Cooking time –0.004 (0.034) 10.431 (12.596) 2.035 (3.609) 
Group membership 0.056 (0.076) –5.695 (28.342) 1.724 (8.490) 
Information –0.153 (0.079) –16.927 (31.643) –8.380 (10.079) 
Sigma
a 
 116.592 (11.601)**  
Number of observations 576 376 576 
Notes: Marginal effects of changing the explanatory variables are evaluated at the mean of the explanatory 
variables. Values in parentheses are standard errors which are robust and cluster corrected. Asterisk (*) and 
double asterisk (**) denote variables significant at 5 per cent and 1 per cent, respectively. WTP = willingness-
to-pay; CWTP = collective willingness-to-pay; fixed exchange rate: EUR 1 = 655.957 FCFA; price of the 
benchmark rice = 300 FCFA/kg (EUR 0.46/kg). 
a
 Sigma is the error variance; log pseudolikelihood of first hurdle = –289.8; log pseudolikelihood of second 
hurdle = –2,172.  
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Table 4. Estimated weights of the multivariate social judgment scheme (SJS) model 
Socio-demographic variable used to predict collective willingness-to-pay Sharpe style weights 
Age 0.341 
Trader 0.284 
Housewife 0.196 
Information 0.113 
Group membership 0.059 
Higher education 0.007 
Daily 0.000 
Household income
 
0.000 
Household size 0.000 
Cooking housemaid 0.000
 
Employment 0.000 
Indigenous 0.000 
Sum 1.000 
Sample size 30 
Notes: Four participants did not agree with the CWTP values convened during the consensus session (Table 1); 
for those cases we set their group weights equal to zero for all variables. In case when a dummy variable was 
zero for all participants, e.g. a group without traders, we attributed equal weight to all participants for that 
variable. 
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Figure 1. Epistemological representation of research disciplines and cross-cutting themes 
connected to the empirical concept of the collective induction treatment 
 
